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Abstract
In their seminal work on authentication, Wegman
and Carter propose that to authenticate multiple
messages, it is sufficient to reuse the same hash
function as long as each tag is encrypted with a
one-time pad. They argue that because the one-
time pad is perfectly hiding, the hash function used
remains completely unknown to the adversary.
Since their proof is not composable, we revisit it
using a composable security framework. It turns
out that the above argument is insufficient: if
the adversary learns whether a corrupted message
was accepted or rejected, information about the
hash function is leaked, and after a bounded fi-
nite amount of rounds it is completely known. We
show however that this leak is very small: Wegman
and Carter’s protocol is still ε-secure, if ε-almost
strongly universal2 hash functions are used. This
implies that the secret key corresponding to the
choice of hash function can be reused in the next
round of authentication without any additional er-
ror than this ε.
We also show that if the players have a mild form
of synchronization, namely that the receiver knows
when a message should be received, the key can
be recycled for any arbitrary task, not only new
rounds of authentication.
1 Introduction
If a player, say, Bob, receives a message x that
claims to come from Alice, he might wish to know
if this is true, or if the message was generated or
modified by some adversary. This task is called au-
thentication, and in their seminal work [1], Wegman
and Carter showed that it can be achieved with in-
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formation-theoretic security by appending a tag t to
the message (often called a message authentication
code or MAC), where t = hk(x), H = {hk}k∈K is
a family of almost strongly universal2 (ASU2) hash
functions,1 and k is a secret key shared by Alice
and Bob.
Wegman and Carter [1] propose a scheme to use
fewer bits of key when multiple messages are to be
authenticated: each tag should be encrypted with
a fresh one-time pad (OTP), but the same hash
function can be used each time. Alice thus appends
the tag ti = hk1(xi) ⊕ k
i
2 to her i
th message xi,
where k1 is used for all messages and k
i
2 is a fresh
key used only in this round.
To prove the security of this scheme, Wegman
and Carter show that given any number of mes-
sage-tag pairs (x1, t1), (x2, t2), . . . , the secret key
k1 is still perfectly uniform. They then argue that
the probability of an adversary successfully corrupt-
ing any new message is the same in every round,
and guaranteed to be small by the properties of
the ASU2 hash functions.
However, proving that a protocol is secure in a
stand-alone model does not necessarily guarantee
that it is still secure when combined with other
protocols, not even when combined with itself like
Wegman and Carter’s scheme. A lot of research has
gone into composability of cryptographic tasks in
recent years. A general framework for proving com-
posable security was developed by Canetti [3–5],
and dubbed Universally Composable (UC) secu-
rity. Independently, Backes, Pfitzmann and Waid-
ner [6–9] introduced the equivalent notion of Re-
active Simulatability. These security notions have
1ASU2 hashing was only formally defined later by Stin-
son [2]. A family of functions is said to be ASU2 if any
two different messages are almost uniformly mapped to all
pairs of tags. An exact definition is given in Definition 1 on
page 4.
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been extended to the quantum setting by Ben-Or
and Mayers [10] and Unruh [11, 12]. More re-
cently, Maurer and Renner proposed a new com-
posable security framework [13], Abstract Cryptog-
raphy (AC), which both generalizes and simplifies
previous frameworks. It defines composability of
abstract systems, without specifying the underly-
ing computational model, and is thus equally valid
for classical and quantum security.2 We use AC in
this work, because of the extra clarity it provides.
The same results could however be obtained from
other composable security frameworks.
An essential application of information-theo-
retic authentication is in quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols.3 Every (classical) message ex-
changed between the two parties generating the key
needs to be authenticated with information-theo-
retic security in order to guarantee that the com-
posed protocol remains secure in the presence of a
computationally unbounded adversary. Recycling
the hash function is a practical way to save a large
part of the secret key consumed in each round. Ben-
Or et al. [15] and Mu¨ller-Quade and Renner [16]
discuss the composability of QKD. More recently,
Portmann and Renner [17] provide an extensive re-
view of composable security with many examples
from QKD. In particular, they show that if the au-
thentication and QKD schemes are proven to be
composable, and if a short initial key is available, a
continuous key stream can be generated with arbi-
trarily small error. But since Wegman and Carter’s
security proof does not fit in any composable secu-
rity framework, it raises the question of whether
this QKD application is still secure.
1.1 Related work
Many works, e.g., [18–21], reuse Wegman and
Carter’s authentication scheme with key recycling,
and they all sketch the security using the same
non-composable argument as Wegman and Carter.
Composable security for key recycling in authen-
tication has been studied in the case of quantum
messages by Hayden, Leung and Mayers [22],4 but
2This unified treatment of classical and quantum cryp-
tography allows for a seamless composition of the two, see
Remark 3 on page 8.
3We refer to a review article such as [14] for a general
overview of QKD.
4In the quantum case, recycling is possible due to the
no-cloning theorem. If the message is successfully authenti-
to the best of our knowledge has not been treated
when the messages are classical.5 Computationally
secure variants of Wegman and Carter’s scheme
have been proposed [23, 24], but not analysed in
a composable framework either.6
Some works [26, 27] have pointed out that infor-
mation-theoretic authentication might not be com-
posable with QKD. They attempt to study this
problem by analyzing the security of authentica-
tion when the secret keys used are not perfect. In
particular, Abidin and Larsson [27] suggest that
when QKD and authentication with key recycling
are combined recursively, and the (imperfect) se-
cret key resulting from QKD is fed back into the
next round of authentication and QKD, the total
error could increase exponentially in the number of
rounds.
1.2 New results
We therefore prove that Wegman and Carter’s au-
thentication scheme with key recycling [1] is secure
using the AC framework of Maurer and Renner [13].
Since this framework defines composable security
independently from the computational model of the
underlying system, any (classical) protocol proven
to be secure is immediately composable with quan-
tum protocols. The authentication scheme with key
recycling studied in this work can thus be used by
a QKD protocol.
We show that simply by learning if a message
was accepted, the recycled hash function is gradu-
ally leaked to the adversary, even when the key used
for the OTP is perfect. This leakage is however very
small: we prove that this scheme is indeed ε-secure
if the hash functions used are ε-ASU2. Since for
any good ASU2 hash function construction ε de-
creases exponentially fast in the size of the family,
log |H|, it can easily be made arbitrarily small. As
a consequence, the doubts of [26,27] are unfounded
cated, the eavesdropper cannot have any information about
it or the corresponding cipher, and therefore has no informa-
tion about the secret key used either.
5Standard information-theoretic authentication — in
which a different hash function is used for every new mes-
sage— has not been explicitly proven to be composable ei-
ther. But as we note in the Appendix, its security reduces
to the stand-alone security criterion used in the literature,
and is therefore immediate from Stinson’s work [2].
6Though the composability of public-key authentication
constructed from digital signatures has been extensively
studied [25].
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for all ranges of the parameter ε. In fact, the hash
functions used are slightly weaker than ASU2 hash-
ing, namely almost XOR universal2 (AXU2) hash
functions.7
In a composable framework, a protocol is said to
be ε-secure, if every use of this protocol increases
the overall error by at most ε.8 An immediate im-
plication of our result and the composability of the
AC framework is that if n messages are authenti-
cated this way in each round of an ε′-secure QKD
protocol, which is run r times, recycling the same
hash function throughout all the runs, the concate-
nation of all generated keys— all bits of key that
have not be used by other rounds of QKD— has
distance at most rnε+ rε′ from uniform.
We analyze Wegman and Carter’s authentication
scheme in two settings. In the first, the sender and
receiver, Alice and Bob, have a mild form of syn-
chronization: Bob knows that a message has been
sent,9 and rejects any message that is delayed for
too long, even if it passes the authentication. The
reason for this is that, were Alice to reuse the key
in an application which leaks it to Eve— e.g., en-
crypting a message known to Eve—Eve could then
use this information about the key to modify the
original message and only then deliver it to Bob,
breaking the authentication scheme. So Alice only
recycles her key after the timeout has occurred.10
The second setting is a completely asynchronous
network. Here, the key cannot be reused arbitrarily.
However, we show that it is still safe to recycle it for
further rounds of authentication. This is because
obtaining extra message-tag pairs give no informa-
tion to Eve about the recycled key. So the delayed
attack outlined above is useless.
7A family of functions is said to be AXU2 if the bitwise
XOR of the hash of any two different messages is almost
uniform over the choice of hash function. See Definition 2
on page 4 for an exact definition.
8More precisely, a protocol is ε-secure if the resulting
real system is ε-close to an ideal system (see Definition 4
on page 8). By a triangle inequality type argument, the
distance of a composed protocol from ideal is the sum of the
distances of the individual protocols [17].
9A similar notion of synchronization was used by Mau-
rer [28] to authenticate a long message given an authentic
channel for a short message, but no shared key.
10Alternatively, Alice could recycle her key before the
timeout if she receives a confirmation of reception from Bob.
But this requires extra authenticated communication, see
the discussion in Section 4.
1.3 Key consumption
Finding an authentication scheme which allows
part of the key to be recycled is quite trivial: if only
part of the key is actually used by the protocol, the
remaining key bits can be “reused”. Alternatively,
the classical message could be authenticated using
the quantum scheme of Hayden et al. [22].11 The
former obviously does not allow any key to be saved,
the latter is impossible to implement (with today’s
technology).
Wegman and Carter’s key recycling scheme is of
interest, because it results in a net gain in secret
key bits consumed and is efficiently implementable
(if the chosen hash functions are efficiently imple-
mentable). It is already in use in QKD systems, for
example in [29]. There, the authors chose to use an
ASU2 hash function construction of Bierbrauer et
al. [30], which is efficiently implementable in hard-
ware. This ASU2 family—which has size log |H| ≈
2 log log |X | + 3 log |T |, where X is the message al-
phabet and T the tag alphabet— is equivalent to
an AXU2 family with an additional OTP, i.e., it
already has the form hk1,k2(x) = h
′
k1
(x) ⊕ k2. It
can thus be used in a scheme with key recycling
without needing any extra key bits to encrypt the
tag for the first message. All subsequent messages
then only need log |T | bits of fresh key, at least a
2/3 gain over using a new hash function each time.
1.4 Structure of this paper
We start in Section 2 with some brief technical
preliminaries. In Section 3 we introduce Abstract
Cryptography, and model standard authentication
(without key recycling) in the AC framework to il-
lustrate its basic principles. In Section 4 we define
the task of recycling part of the key for arbitrary
use. We show that this is achieved by Wegman and
Carter’s scheme with a mild form of synchroniza-
tion between sender and receiver. In Section 5 we
recursively use the authentication scheme n times,
but in a fully asynchronous network, and prove that
it is secure with error nε. And finally in Section 6
we take a closer look at the secret key which is
leaked to the adversary, and show that an optimal
attack over n rounds of authentication which takes
11Although this would only allow the key to be recycled
if the authentication is successful.
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advantage of this key leakage allows the adversary
to break the scheme with probability exactly nε.
2 Technical preliminaries
2.1 Notation
In the AC framework that we introduce in the next
section, the real and ideal systems12 are modeled
as (black) boxes with ports that take inputs and
produce outputs. We use upper case letters,—X ,
Y —to label these ports, lower case letters—x, y—
to denote the values that are in- or output, and a
calligraphic font for the alphabets of permitted val-
ues— X , Y. To describe probability distributions
over these values we write PX , QX , where the sub-
script denotes the port. Different distributions over
the same port are differentiated by the main upper
case letter, e.g., P , Q. For example, in the real
setting x might be output at port X with probabil-
ity PX(x) and in the ideal setting with probability
QX(x). To denote the probability of y being out-
put at port Y given that x was input at port X , we
use standard notation and write PY |X(y|x).
2.2 Statistical distance
To measure the distance between two settings with
distributions PX and QX , we use the statistical or
total variation distance, which is given by
1
2
∑
x∈X
|PX(x)−QX(x)|
= max
X ′⊆X
∑
x∈X ′
(PX(x) −QX(x))
=
∑
x:PX(x)>QX (x)
(PX(x)−QX(x)). (1)
In this paper we use many times this last equality
to bound the statistical distance. We find the sub-
set X ′ ⊆ X for which PX(x) ≥ QX(x), and then
only need to evaluate the distributions PX and QX
on this subset.
12Composable security frameworks define security as the
distance between the real system and some ideal system that
performs the task in an perfect way.
2.3 Universal hashing
Standard authentication is performed by sending
the message along with a hash of it, where the hash
function is taken from an ASU2 family, defined as
follows.
Definition 1 (strongly universal2 hash func-
tion13 [2]). A family of hash functions {hk : X →
T }k∈K is said to be ε-almost strongly universal2 (ε-
ASU2) if for k chosen uniformly at random and all
x1, x2 ∈ X with x1 6= x2 and all t1, t2 ∈ T ,
Pr
k
[hk(x1) = t1 and hk(x2) = t2] ≤
ε
|T |
. (2)
In the case of key recycling, we use a weaker fam-
ily of hash functions, but then encrypt the tag with
a OTP. These hash functions have been dubbed
ε-almost XOR universal2 by Rogaway [20], ε-otp
secure by Krawczyk [18, 19], and ε-∆ universal by
Stinson [31].14
Definition 2 (XOR universal2 hash function [20]).
A family of hash functions {hk : X → T }k∈K for
T = {0, 1}m is said to be ε-almost XOR universal2
(ε-AXU2) if for k chosen uniformly at random and
all x1, x2 ∈ X with x1 6= x2 and all t ∈ T ,
Pr
k
[hk(x1)⊕ hk(x2) = t] ≤ ε. (3)
It is immediate from this definition that the hash
function gk1,k2(x) := hk1(x)⊕k2 is ε-ASU2, i.e., for
all x1, x2 ∈ X with x1 6= x2 and all t1, t2 ∈ T ,
Pr
k1,k2
[gk1,k2(x1) = t1 and gk1,k2(x2) = t2] ≤
ε
|T |
.
We derive two more useful statements about hash
functions of the form gk1,k2(x) = hk1(x)⊕k2, where
hk1 is ε-AXU2. The first is that the tag for one
message is uniformly distributed and independent
from the key k1: since XORing a uniform string k2
to any value yields a uniform string we have for all
x, t and k1,
Pr
k2
[gk1,k2(x) = t] =
1
|T |
. (4)
13The more common definition of strongly universal2 hash-
ing [2, 21, 30, 31] has an extra condition, namely that for all
x ∈ X and t ∈ T , Pr[hk(x) = t] =
1
|T |
. This is however not
a necessary condition to prove the security of authentication,
so we omit it.
14Stinson [31] generalizes this notion to any additive
abelian group T instead of only bit strings.
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The second is a conditional form of the strongly
universal2 property of these hash functions: by
combining the two equations above we immediately
get
Pr
k1,k2
[gk1,k2(x2) = t2|gk1,k2(x1) = t1] ≤ ε. (5)
These probabilities of hashing to a certain value
can be rewritten has as conditional probabilities of
the in- and outputs of an authentication system in
the following way. If a message x is input into an au-
thentication system which outputs a tag t = hk(x),
the probability distribution of the tag is given by
PT |X(t|x) = Pr
k
[hk(x) = t].
If an adversary obtains a valid message and tag x‖t
and chooses some x′‖t′ to input into a verification
system which outputs a decision y ∈ {acc, rej},
the probability of this corrupted message of being
accepted is
PY |XTX′T ′(acc|x, t, x
′, t′)
= Pr
k
[hk(x
′) = t′|hk(x) = t].
3 Abstract cryptography
To model security we use Maurer and Renner’s [13]
Abstract Cryptography framework. In this section
we give an introduction to the special case needed
in this work, namely information-theoretic security
of classical systems with three parties, an honest
Alice and Bob and dishonest Eve. For more exten-
sive introductions to the AC framework in the three
party setting we refer to [32] and [17]. The first ref-
erence treats only the classical case, the second is
also valid for quantum systems.
The AC security definition15 applies to abstract
systems, which can be instantiated with different
models of computation. In particular, it is equally
valid for classical and quantum systems [17, 33],
and any protocol proven to be information-the-
oretic “classically secure” is immediately “quan-
tum secure”. An equivalent to Unruh’s lifting
lemma [12] — which proves that classical UC se-
curity of a classical scheme implies quantum UC
security— is unnecessary, since this is immediate
from the model.16
15Definition 4 on page 8.
16See Remark 3 on page 8 for further explanation.
3.1 Overview
The traditional approach to defining security can
be seen as bottom-up. One first defines (at a low
level) a computational model (e.g., a Turing ma-
chine or a circuit). Based on this, the concept of
an algorithm for the model and a communication
model (e.g., based on tapes) are defined. After this,
notions of complexity, efficiency, and finally the se-
curity of a cryptosystem can be defined. The AC
framework uses a top-down approach: in order to
state definitions and develop a theory, one starts
from the other end, the highest possible level of ab-
straction— the composition of abstract systems—
and proceeds downwards, introducing in each new
lower level only the minimal necessary specializa-
tions. One may give the analogous example of
group theory, which is used to describe matrix mul-
tiplication. In the bottom-up approach, one would
start explaining how matrices are multiplied, and
then based on this find properties of the matrix mul-
tiplication. In contrast to this, the AC approach
would correspond to first defining the (abstract)
multiplication group and prove theorems already
on this level. The matrix multiplication would then
be introduced as a special case of the multiplicative
group.
On a high level of abstraction, a cryptographic
protocol, π, can be seen as constructing some re-
source S from other resourcesR. For example, infor-
mation-theoretic authentication constructs an au-
thentic channel resource from an insecure channel
resource and a secret key resource. The resource
constructed can be used by other protocols, e.g.,
a QKD protocol uses an insecure quantum chan-
nel resource and an authentic (classical) channel
to construct a secret key resource. In general how-
ever, these resources are not constructed perfectly,
there is some small probability, ε, that the adver-
sary can break the scheme, e.g., corrupt a message
or learn a secret key. If π constructs S out of R
within ε, we write
R
pi,ε
−−→ S. (6)
For a cryptographic construction to be usable in
an arbitrary context, it needs to be composable, i.e.,
the following conditions must be fulfilled:
R
pi,ε
−−→ S and S
pi′,ε′
−−−→ T =⇒ R
pi′◦pi,ε+ε′
−−−−−−→ T,
R
pi,ε
−−→ S and R′
pi′,ε′
−−−→ S′ =⇒ R‖R′
pi|pi′,ε+ε′
−−−−−−→ S‖S′,
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where R‖R′ is a parallel composition of resources,
and π′ ◦π and π|π′ are sequential and parallel com-
position of protocols. In Section 3.3 we give a defi-
nition for Eq. (6) which satisfies these composable
conditions. Intuitively, the resource R along with
the protocol π are part of the real world, and the
resource S is the ideal resource we want to build.
Eq. (6) is then satisfied if an adversary could, in
an ideal world where the ideal resource is available,
achieve anything that she could achieve in the real
world. This argument involves, as a thought exper-
iment, simulator systems which transform the ideal
resource into the real world system consisting of the
real resource and the protocol. But before stating
the security definition, we first define in Section 3.2
the elements present in Eq. (6), namely resources
R, S, a protocol π, and a pseudo-metric17 on the
space of resources to quantify the failure ε.
3.2 Resources, converters and distin-
guishers
On the highest level of abstraction, a system is an
abstract object with interfaces that interacts with
its environment and with other systems. Two sys-
tems can be composed into a single system by con-
necting one interface of each system. In order to
define Eq. (6), it is sufficient to introduce (abstract)
systems that can be composed into larger systems
and define an appropriate pseudo-metric. These
systems can then be instantiated at a lower level
with any formalism that satisfies the abstract (com-
position and metric) properties required by the ab-
stract systems, e.g., random systems [34,35] in the
classical case, or, if the underlying computational
model is quantum, as a sequence of completely pos-
itive, trace-preserving maps with internal memory
(e.g., quantum strategies [36] and combs [37]). It
is however not necessary to define— or even con-
sider— these lower levels to define cryptographic
security.
Since the concrete systems used in this work are
all very intuitive, we will not provide a generic
17A function d : Ω × Ω → R+ is a pseudo-metric on Ω if
for all a, b, c ∈ Ω the three following conditions hold:
d(a, a) = 0,
d(a, b) = d(b, a),
d(a, b) ≤ d(a, c) + d(c, b).
If additionally d(a, b) = 0 =⇒ a = b, then d is a metric.
(mathematical) definition of these lower levels. In-
stead we define each concrete system individually
when needed.
Resource. An I-resource is an (abstract) sys-
tem with interfaces specified by a set I (e.g., I =
{A,B,E}). Each interface i ∈ I is accessible to a
user i and provides her or him with certain func-
tionalities. Resources are equipped with a parallel
composition operator, ‖, that maps two resources
to another resource.
Converter. To transform one resource into an-
other, we use converters. These are (abstract) sys-
tems with two interfaces, an inside interface and
an outside interface. The inside interface connects
to an interface of a resource, and the outside inter-
face becomes the new interface of the constructed
resource. We write either αiR or Rαi to denote the
new resource with the converter αi connected at the
interface i,18 and αR or Rα for a set of converters
α = {αi}i, for which it is clear to which interface
they connect. Converters are equipped with paral-
lel and sequential composition operators, | and ◦,
that map two converters to another converter. A
protocol π = {πi}i is a set of converters πi, indexed
by a subset of interfaces i ∈ I.
Example. To illustrate these notions we model
standard information-theoretic authentication. To
provide an example it is necessary to make these
systems concrete. We only do this informally in
the following. By using the language of random
systems [34, 35] (or any other appropriate formal-
ism), this may be made mathematically precise.
Let us first consider the resources used in the con-
struction of an authentic channel. A secret key re-
source,K, can be seen as a box that outputs a secret
key at Alice’s and Bob’s interfaces, but does not
provide any functionality at Eve’s interface. This
is illustrated in Figure 1.
The authentication protocol is run over an inse-
cure channel, C, completely under the control of
Eve. One way of modeling such a channel is to al-
low Eve to intercept the message sent from Alice to
18There is no mathematical difference between αiR and
Rαi. It sometimes simplifies the notation to have the con-
verters for some players written on the right of the resource
and the ones for other players on the left, instead of all on
the same side, hence the two notations.
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Alice Bob
Eve
key
k k
Figure 1 – A secret key resource K that always
gives a key k to Alice and Bob, and nothing to
Eve.
Alice Bob
Eve
x
x x′
x′
Figure 2 – An insecure channel C from Alice
to Bob. Eve obtains Alice’s message x, and can
choose what Bob receives, e.g., x′.
Bob, and replace it with any message of her choice.
This is depicted in Figure 2.
The channel we wish to construct from a secret
key and insecure channel, is an authentic channel
resource, A. Ideally, we would like the channel to
always deliver the correct message to the receiver.
This is however impossible to construct from an
insecure channel, since Eve can always jumble the
communication between Alice and Bob. What can
be constructed, is a channel which guarantees that
Bob does not receive a corrupted message. He ei-
ther receives the correct message sent by Alice, or
an error, which symbolizes an attempt by Eve to
change or block the message. This can be modelled
by giving Eve’s idealized interface two controls: the
first provides her with Alice’s message, the second
allows her to decide if Alice’s message should be
delivered to Bob or if he gets an error flag instead.
We illustrate this in Figure 3. Note that Eve also
has the option of not inputting anything. In a com-
pletely asynchronous model, Bob would then not re-
ceiving anything. If the model allows him to know
that a message was sent, he would get an error flag
⊥ after the timeout.
For Alice to send an authenticated message to
Bob, her part of the protocol, πauthA , is a converter,
which gets a key k at the inner interface from an
ideal key resource, a message x at the outer inter-
face from Alice, computes a tag t = hk(x) and
sends the concatenation of the message and tag,
x‖t through its inside interface down the insecure
Alice Bob
Eve
x
x
x,⊥
0, 1
Figure 3 – An authentic channel A from Alice
to Bob. Eve obtains Alice’s message x, and can
choose whether Bob receives the original message
or an error ⊥.
t :=
hk(x)
piauth
A
t′
?
=
hk(x
′)
piauth
B
key
Secret key K
Insecure channel C
k k
x x
′,⊥
x‖t x′‖t′
Figure 4 – The real authentication system. Alice
has access to the left interface, Bob to the right
interface and Eve to the lower interface. The con-
verters (piauthA , pi
auth
B ) of the authentication proto-
col are connected to the resource K‖C consisting
of a secret key and an insecure channel. piauthA gen-
erates a tag t for the message x using the secret
key k. piauthB checks if the received message and
tag, x′‖t′, match.
channel. Bob’s part of the protocol, πauthB , gets the
same key as Alice, k, from the ideal key resource at
its inner interface, a message x′‖t′ from the channel
at its inner interface, and outputs at its outer inter-
face either x′ if t′ = hk(x
′), or an error ⊥ otherwise.
This is depicted in Figure 4.
Distinguisher. To measure how close two re-
sources are, we define a pseudo-metric19 on the
space of resources. We do this with the help of
a distinguisher. For n-interface resources a distin-
guisher D is a system with n+ 1 interfaces, where
n interfaces connect to the interfaces of a resource
R and the other (outside) interface outputs a bit.
For a class of distinguishers D, the induced pseudo-
metric, the distinguishing advantage, is
d(R, S) := max
D∈D
Pr[DR = 1]− Pr[DS = 1],
19Recall Footnote 17 on page 6.
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where DR is the binary random variable corre-
sponding to D connected to R. In this work we
study information-theoretic security, and therefore
the only class of distinguishers that we consider is
the set of all distinguishers. If d(R, S) ≤ ε, we say
that the two resources are ε-close and sometimes
write R ≈ε S; or R = S if ε = 0.
In Section 3.4 we introduce some of the proper-
ties of the distinguishing advantage. We also show
how it can be related to the statistical distance be-
tween the probability distributions of the underly-
ing real and ideal systems.
Remark 3. If two classical systems R and S are
indistinguishable for the set of all classical distin-
guishers, then they are also indistinguishable for
the set of all quantum distinguishers, since clas-
sical computers (or distinguishers) can simulate
quantum ones. A secure classical protocol is then
secure regardless of whether it is later composed
with quantum systems. This is immediate from
the framework without needing to define quantum
security.20
3.3 Security definition
We can now define the security of a protocol in the
three party setting with honest Alice and Bob, and
dishonest Eve.
Definition 4 (Composable security [13]). Let R
and S be resources with interfaces I = {A,B,E}.
We say that a protocol π = (πA, πB) (securely) con-
structs S out of R within ε, and write R
pi,ε
−−→ S, if
the two following conditions hold:
i) For converters ♯E and ♭E which emulate an
honest behavior at Eve’s interfaces,
d(πR♯E , S♭E) ≤ ε.
ii) There exists a converter σE — which we call
simulator— such that
d(πR, SσE) ≤ ε.
If it is clear from the context what resources R and
S are meant, we simply say that π is ε-secure.
20In the case of computational security, the class of clas-
sical distinguishers efficiently implementable on a quantum
computer guarantees security under composition with quan-
tum systems.
The first of these two conditions can be seen as
capturing correctness of the protocol in the case
where no adversary is present, i.e., when the distin-
guisher does not access the adversarial controls cov-
ered by ♯E and ♭E . If however the opponent is ac-
tive, the converters ♯E , ♭E are removed and the dis-
tinguisher has full access to Eve’s interfaces. This
is captured by the second condition in Definition 4.
In the case of authentication, it is not hard to see
that πauth(K‖C)♯E = A♭E . If the converter ♯E
faithfully transmits the string x‖t to Bob, the sys-
tem πauth(K‖C)♯E is a simple channel that trans-
mits Alice’s message x to Bob. If the converter
♭E at Eve’s interface of the ideal authentic channel
A inputs the bit allowing Alice’s message through,
we then also have a channel that transmits Alice’s
message x to Bob.
To show that condition (ii) is fulfilled (for some
well chosen family of hash functions), we need to
find a simulator σauthE that can recreate the real
E-interface while accessing just the idealized one.
An obvious choice for the simulator is to first gener-
ate its own key k and output x‖hk(x). Then upon
receiving x′‖t′, it checks if x′‖t′ = x‖hk(x) and
sets the control bit of the ideal authentic channel
A accordingly. If the distinguisher chooses to pro-
vide the inputs in reversed order, first input x′‖t′
at the E-interface and then choose a message x
that it inputs at the A-interface, the simulator al-
ways sets the control bit on the authentic channel
to output an error ⊥ at the B-interface and does
not choose the key k uniformly at random from the
entire set, but only from the subset of keys such
that hk(x
′) 6= t′. We illustrate this simulator in
Figure 5.
3.4 Distinguishing advantage
Because it is a pseudo-metric, the distinguishing
advantage respects the triangle inequality. For any
resources R, S,T,
d(R, S) ≤ d(R,T) + d(T, S). (7)
The distinguishing advantage is also non-increas-
ing under composition with any other (abstract)
system. For any systems R, S,T,
d(RT, ST) ≤ d(R, S). (8)
This holds because the distinguisher can run T in-
ternally, so the maximization over all distinguishers
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t = hk(x)
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?
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x′‖t′
x‖t x′‖t′
key
Figure 5 – The ideal authentication system. Al-
ice has access to the left interface, Bob to the right
interface and Eve to the lower interface. The sim-
ulator σauthE is plugged into the E-interface of the
ideal authentic channel A. It generates its own
tag t = hk(x) to simulate the message x‖t on the
insecure channel, and notifies the ideal authentic
channel to output an error ⊥ if any part of x‖t got
changed.
already includes the composition with T.21
Resources can be seen as interactive black boxes.
Each interface has various ports which either take
inputs or produce outputs. A distinguisher holding
a resource can input the value of its choosing at
any port (as long as the value is from the permit-
ted alphabet for that port), and store the outputs
it receives. For example, if it holds the real au-
thentication system of Figure 4, it can input some
message x at the A-interface and receives x‖t at the
E-interface. This in- and output pair is described
by a joint probability distribution PXT where X is
the label of the input port on the A-interface, and T
denotes the port outputting t on the E-interface.22
After having interacted with all the ports, the dis-
tinguisher can make a guess as to whether it is hold-
ing the real or the ideal system. Its distinguish-
ing advantage is given by the statistical distance
(Eq. (1)) between the probability distributions of
the corresponding in- and outputs. By maximizing
the statistical distance over all permutations of the
input ports and all choices of inputs we get the dis-
tinguishing advantage between the two resources.
21This also holds in the case of computational security,
since the class of efficiently implementable distinguishers is
closed under composition with efficiently implementable sys-
tems T.
22x is also output at the E-interface, but since it is always
identical to the input at port X, we avoid writing it a second
time.
For example, the real and ideal authentication
systems of Figures 4 and 5 take two inputs, a mes-
sage x at the X port of the A-interface and a string
x′‖t′ at the X ′T ′ port of the E-interface, so there
are also two orderings in which the distinguisher
can interact with the system. In the standard au-
thentication literature these two possible orders are
referred to as substitution attack (when the distin-
guisher first obtains x‖t and modifies it to create
x′‖t′) and impersonation attack (when the distin-
guisher directly generates x′‖t′ without having seen
a valid message-tag pair).
In the case of a substitution attack, let the dis-
tinguisher choose some input x with probability
PX(x). It then receives x‖t where PT |X(t|x) is de-
fined by the scheme used, and is identical in the
real and ideal situations. It chooses some x′‖t′
with probability PX′T ′|XT (x
′, t′|x, t), and receives
a final output y which can take two values, x′ or
⊥. The probability of taking either of these values
is however different in the real and ideal settings.
In the real one, y = x′ if hk(x
′) = t′, and in the
ideal one, y = x′ if x′‖t′ = x‖t. Let PY |XTX′T ′
and QY |XTX′T ′ be the probability distributions of
y in these two settings. The real world is then
completely described by PXTX′T ′Y and the ideal
world by QXTX′T ′Y , where QXTX′T ′ = PXTX′T ′ .
The distinguisher can now pick a subset of values
D ⊆ X × T ×X × T × (X ∪ {⊥}), for which it will
guess that it is holding the real system, i.e., for all
(x, t, x′, t′, y) ∈ D it outputs 1 and for all others it
outputs 0. Its advantage is then
max
D
∑
(x,t,x′,t′,y)∈D
(PXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x
′, t′, y)
−QXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x
′, t′, y))
=
1
2
∑
x,t,x′,t′,y
|PXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x
′, t′, y)
−QXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x
′, t′, y)|, (9)
the statistical distance between PXTX′T ′Y and
QXTX′T ′Y .
In the case of an impersonation attack, the dis-
tinguisher will gain nothing from inputting x, after
having input x′‖t′: if it was lucky and the real sys-
tem accepted x′‖t′, it can already distinguish them
with advantage 1, and if x′‖t′ was rejected, both
systems will generate a x‖t with the same distribu-
tion since the simulator picks k from all keys such
9
that hk(x
′) 6= t′. We can thus consider only the
ports X ′T ′ and Y . The advantage is then
1
2
∑
x′,t′,y
|PX′T ′Y (x
′, t′, y)−QX′T ′Y (x
′, t′, y)|. (10)
In Appendix A we provide a proof that Eqs. (9)
and (10) are both bounded by ε for all
PX , PX′T ′|XT and PX′T ′ , respectively, if ε-ASU2
hash functions are used by the protocol.
4 Arbitrary key recycling
with synchronization
The authentication protocol depicted in Figure 4
requires a new hash function and therefore a (com-
pletely) new secret key k for every new message.
We study in this section a scheme which allows part
of the secret key to be reused. Intuitively, this is
possible because the recycled part of the key is al-
most uniform conditioned on all the inputs, outputs
and the adversary’s information produced through-
out the protocol.
It is however vital that the key be recycled only
after the receiver, Bob, either obtains the message
or decides not to accept anymore an incoming mes-
sage. Otherwise Eve could first obtain the recycled
key from whatever protocol uses it next and then
modify the authenticated message. In this section
we thus assume a mild form of synchronization be-
tween sender and receiver: an incoming message
will not be accepted by Bob after the key has been
recycled by Alice.
For practicality we model this as a timeout, i.e.,
after a predefined amount of time has passed the
sender can recycle the key and the receiver will not
accept a message arriving late. It can however be
achieved by other means, e.g., Bob sends an authen-
ticated acknowledgment of receptions. This occurs
naturally if the messages alternate, one from Al-
ice to Bob and the next from Bob to Alice. If Al-
ice successfully authenticates an incoming message,
this guarantees— up to an error ε— that her pre-
vious message was received by Bob, who otherwise
would not have sent the next message. So she can
already recycle the key, even if the timeout has not
occurred. Likewise Bob can recycle the key used
for the messages in the other direction as soon as
he receives an authenticated response from Alice.
Authentic channel A+
key
x x,⊥
kk
x 0, 1
Figure 6 – An authentic channel with key recy-
cling A+. Alice has access to the left interface,
Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower
interface. Eve obtains Alice’s message x, and can
choose whether Bob receives the original message
or an error ⊥. After providing Bob with the error
or message, the resource generates a new key k,
which is given to both Alice and Bob.
4.1 Ideal resource
An authentic channel with key recycling, A+, does
not only guarantee that the message delivered has
not been tampered with, it also provides the users
with a new (recycled) key that they can use for
any arbitrary application requiring a shared secret
key. It can be seen as the combination of an au-
thentic channel (Figure 3) and a secret key resource
(Figure 1), which we illustrate in Figure 6.
This ideal resource must follow the same timing
rules as the real system. As Bob can recycle the
key has soon as he receives the message from Alice,
the resource A+ outputs the new key k at the B-in-
terface at the same time as the message x or the
decision to reject it, ⊥. However, the new key k
is only output at the A-interface when the timeout
occurs. In the real system, Bob’s protocol can out-
put an error ⊥ if no message has arrived when the
time is up, since no late message is accepted. The
ideal resource A+ thus also outputs ⊥ in this case.
4.2 Protocol
Like for standard authentication, we construct the
ideal resource from a secret key and an insecure
channel. As stated in the introduction, the main
idea is to encrypt the tag t appended to the mes-
sage in standard authentication with a OTP, and
then reuse the same hash function. For this, Alice’s
protocol πauth+A splits the shared secret key in two
parts k = k1‖k2, and uses them to generate a tag
t := hk1(x)⊕k2 for the message x, where {hk}k is a
family of ε-AXU hash functions. The string x‖t is
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t :=
hk1(x) ⊕
k2
pi
auth+
A
t′
?
=
hk1(x
′)⊕k2
pi
auth+
B
key
Secret key K
Insecure channel C
k1‖k2 k1‖k2x x
′,⊥
k1 k1
x‖t x′‖t′
Figure 7 – The real authentication with key recy-
cling system. Alice has access to the left interface,
Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower
interface. piauth+
A
first receives a message x and
key k1‖k2, and sends x‖t to Bob. pi
auth+
B
checks
whether t′ = hk1(x
′) ⊕ k2 and outputs the result
x′ or ⊥. Both converters recycle k1, Bob’s imme-
diately and Alice’s after the timeout.
sent to Bob on the insecure channel C. After a pre-
defined amount of time has elapsed, Alice outputs
the key k1 for recycling.
Bob’s protocol πauth+B , upon receiving x
′‖t′ on
the insecure channel, checks whether t′ = hk1(x
′)⊕
k2, and if so, it accepts and outputs the message
x′ at its outer interface. Otherwise, it outputs an
error symbol ⊥. If no message has been received
before the timeout, it outputs an error and does
not accept incoming messages any more. The key
k1 is also output for recycling as soon as accepted or
rejected, or a timeout occurred. The entire protocol
is depicted in Figure 7.
If Eve does not intervene, security is modeled by
placing a converter ♯E over the E-interface of the
system, which connects the out- and in-ports of the
insecure channel and emulates an honest behavior
by forwarding x‖t to Bob.
4.3 Security
To prove that the protocol depicted in Figure 7
constructs the ideal resource of Figure 6, we need
to find a simulator σauth+E that when plugged into
the idealized E-interface of the authentication chan-
nel with key recycling recreates the real interface
of Figure 7. We do this with the simulator from
Figure 8.
Similar to that of Figure 5, the simulator σauth+E
generates a tag t uniformly at random, which it out-
puts with the message x. Then upon receiving x′‖t′,
key
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Figure 8 – The ideal authentication with key recy-
cling system. Alice has access to the left interface,
Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower
interface. Upon receiving a message x from the
ideal channel, the simulator σauth+
E
picks a tag t
uniformly at random and outputs x‖t at the E-in-
terface. When it receives x′‖t′, it checks if this is
equal to x‖t, and sets the control bit on the ideal
channel accordingly.
it checks if the message has been changed and noti-
fies the ideal resource A+ of this. In the case of an
impersonation attack, in which first x′‖t′ is input
at the E-interface and then x at the A-interface,
the simulator still generates the tag t uniformly at
random.
Theorem 5. The protocol (πauth+A , π
auth+
B ) de-
scribed above is ε-secure, i.e.,
K‖C
piauth+,ε
−−−−−→ A+.
As described in Section 3.4, the real and ideal
systems depicted in Figures 7 and 8 can be seen as
interactive black boxes. The distinguisher is given
one of the two, can input the values of its choos-
ing, and based on the outputs, it must guess which
of the two it is holding. Similar to the discussion
in Section 3.4, for every ordering of the inputs and
every (probabilistic) choice of inputs we derive a
probability distribution of the in- and outputs for
the real and ideal systems, and need to bound the
statistical distance between the two. To do this,
we show that the probability of an event which in-
cludes a rejected corrupted message is always larger
in the ideal case. Since the probability of an event
which includes an accepted corrupted message is
always larger in the real case (it never happens in
the ideal case), we have from Eq. (1) that the sta-
tistical distance reduces to the difference between
the distributions in the case of accepted corrupted
messages. But this is simply the probability of ac-
cepting a corrupted message in the real setting.
Proof. In the case where no adversary is present,
we trivially have
πauth+(K‖C)♯E = A
+♭E ,
since both systems are equivalent to a channel that
faithfully transmits a message from Alice to Bob.
So we only need to analyze the case of an active
adversary.
Each box in Figures 7 and 8 takes two inputs—
a message x at the A-interface, and possibly cor-
rupted message x′||t′ at the E-interface. So the
distinguisher can choose to start by first providing
either some x or some x′||t′ to the system it is hold-
ing.
We first analyze the latter, the impersonation at-
tack. Note that after choosing the input x′‖t′ and
receiving Bob’s output and the recycled key at the
B-interface, the distinguisher can still input a value
x at the A-interface and receive the corresponding
tag t. Let PX′T ′Y KXT and QX′T ′Y KXT describe
the distributions of the real and ideal systems. We
show in the following that for all x′, t′, k1, x, t,
PX′T ′Y KXT (x
′, t′,⊥, k1, x, t)
≤ QX′T ′YKXT (x
′, t′,⊥, k1, x, t). (11)
Since QX′T ′Y KXT (x
′, t′, x′, k1, x, t) = 0, the statis-
tical distance is then given by
∑
x′,t′,k1,x,t
PX′T ′YKXT (x
′, t′, x′, k1, x, t)
=
∑
x′,t′
PX′T ′Y (x
′, t′, x′)
=
∑
x′,t′
PX′T ′(x
′, t′)PY |X′T ′(x
′|x′, t′)
=
∑
x′,t′
PX′T ′(x
′, t′)2−|k2| = 2−|k2|,
where to reach the last line we used Eq. (4), namely
PY |X′T ′(x
′|x′, t′) = Pr
k1,k2
[hk1(x
′)⊕ k2 = t
′] =
1
2|k2|
.
It now remains to show that Eq. (11) holds. In
the ideal case the tag t and key k1 are always gen-
erated uniformly at random and ⊥ is output of the
Y port with probability 1. So
QX′T ′Y KXT (x
′, t′,⊥, k1, x, t)
= QX′T ′(x
′, t′)QY |X′,T ′(⊥|x
′, t′)
QK|X′T ′Y (k1|x
′, t′,⊥)QX|X′T ′YK(x|x
′, t′,⊥, k1)
QT |X′T ′YKX(t|x
′, t′,⊥, k1, x)
= PX′T ′(x
′, t′)PX|X′T ′Y K(x|x
′, t′,⊥, k1)2
−|k1|−|k2|.
In the real case, the probability of accepting x′ is
exactly 2−|k2|, so the probability of detecting the
impersonation is
PY |X′,T ′(⊥|x
′, t′) = 1− 2−|k2|.
As shown in Eq. (4), the probability of detecting
the impersonation is actually independent of the
value of the recycled key, hence
PK|X′T ′Y (k1|x
′, t′,⊥) = 2−|k1|.
Finally, knowledge of an invalid pair (x′, t′) and the
recycled key k1 excludes exactly one possible value
for t, the others are all equally likely. So
PT |X′T ′YKX(t|x
′, t′,⊥, k1, x) ≤
1
2|k2| − 1
.
Putting this together,
PX′T ′YKXT (x
′, t′,⊥, k1, x, t)
= PX′T ′(x
′, t′)PY |X′,T ′(⊥|x
′, t′)
PK|X′T ′Y (k1|x
′, t′,⊥)PX|X′T ′YK(x|x
′, t′,⊥, k1)
PT |X′T ′Y KX(t|x
′, t′,⊥, k1, x)
≤ PX′T ′(x
′, t′)PX|X′T ′YK(x|x
′, t′,⊥, k1)2
−|k1|−|k2|
= QX′T ′YKXT (x
′, t′,⊥, k1, x, t).
We now consider the substitution attack. In both
the real and ideal cases, the distinguisher chooses
some x, obtains x‖t and then has to pick some x′‖t′.
Note that if the distinguisher chooses x′ = x, both
systems behave identically: they reject x′ if t′ 6= t,
accept it if t′ = t, and output a recycled key which
is uniform and independent from (x, t, x′, t′) (see
Eq. (4) for the independence of k1). So it is suffi-
cient to consider strategies for which x′ 6= x. Thus,
w.l.o.g. we assume that the distinguisher chooses
values for the inputs at ports X and X ′ such that
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for all x, PXX′(x, x) = QXX′(x, x) = 0. In the
following, we show that for all x, t, x′, t′, k1
PXTX′T ′Y K(x, t, x
′, t′,⊥, k1)
≤ QXTX′T ′Y K(x, t, x
′, t′,⊥, k1). (12)
Since QXTX′T ′YK(x, t, x
′, t′, x′, k1) = 0, the statis-
tical distance is then given by
∑
x,t,x′,t′,k1
PXTX′T ′YK(x, t, x
′, t′, x′, k1)
=
∑
x,t,x′,t′
PXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x
′, t′, x′)
=
∑
x,t,x′,t′
PXTX′T ′(x, t, x
′, t′)
PY |XTX′T ′(x
′|x, t, x′, t′)
≤
∑
x,t,x′,t′
PXTX′T ′(x, t, x
′, t′)ε = ε,
where to reach the last line we used
PY |XTX′T ′(x
′|x, t, x′, t′) =
Pr
k1,k2
[hk1(x
′)⊕ k2 = t
′|hk1(x) ⊕ k2 = t]
and Eq. (5).
It now remains to prove that Eq. (12) holds.
Note that
QXTX′T ′YK(x, t, x
′, t′,⊥, k1)
= PXTX′T ′(x, t, x
′, t′)2−|k1|,
so it is sufficient to show that for all x, t, x′, t′, k1,
PYK|XTX′T ′(⊥, k1|x, t, x
′, t′) ≤ 2−|k1|.
This is however immediate from
PY K|XTX′T ′(⊥, k1|x, t, x
′, t′)
= PK|XTX′T ′(k1|x, t, x
′, t′)
PY |XTX′T ′K(⊥|x, t, x
′, t′, k1)
≤ PK|XTX′T ′(k1|x, t, x
′, t′)
= PK|XT (k1|x, t) = 2
−|k1|,
where in the last line we used the fact that knowing
one valid message-tag pair (x, t) provides no infor-
mation about k1, already expressed in Eq. (4).
5 Key recycling for further
rounds of authentication
Since the key recycled in the scheme analyzed in
Section 4 can be used for arbitrary applications, it
can be used in particular for authenticating another
message. By the composition of the security defi-
nition, running n times that protocol for authenti-
cating n messages is nε-secure and uses a key of
total length |k1|+n|k2|. This requires synchroniza-
tion between every message, e.g., if the timeout is
set to s seconds and all messages go from Alice to
Bob with no other communication, then only one
message could be sent every s seconds.
It is however possible to authenticate multi-
ple messages without any form of synchronization.
This is because revealing new message-tag pairs
does not leak any information about the key k1 to
the adversary, since the tags are one-time padded
by k2. Hence the next rounds of authentication can
be started before Bob receives the message from the
first round. It is only necessary to be synchronized
after all the messages have been delivered, so that
k1 may then be put back in the pool of keys for
arbitrary future use.
If the key k1 is deleted after n rounds of authen-
tication instead of being recycled, then no synchro-
nization is needed at all. The security proof for
the protocol in a completely asynchronous network
follows as a corollary from security with synchro-
nization, in which k1 is deleted after n rounds.
5.1 Real and ideal systems
We thus define the protocol πauth
+
n to authenti-
cate n messages by using one key k1, n keys
{ki2}
n
i=1 —we denote by Kn the resource generat-
ing these keys— and a multiple use insecure chan-
nel Cn. The tag for the i
th message xi is given by
ti = hk1(xi)⊕ k
i
2, where {hk}k∈K is a ε-AXU2 fam-
ily of hash functions. As in the previous section,
we assume a mild form of synchronization which al-
lows the key k1 to be recycled by Alice at the end of
the protocol, when all n messages have either been
received or Bob has decided not to accept any more
incoming messages. Bob’s protocol can however re-
cycle k1 as soon as all messages have been received.
If some messages are still missing after the timeout,
Bob’s protocol outputs an error for each of these
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Figure 9 – The real multiple authentication with
key recycling system. Alice has access to the left
interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to the
lower interface. The ith message xi is appended
with a tag ti = hk1(xi) ⊕ k
i
2, where a different k
i
2
is used for every message but the same k1 is reused
throughout. Bob’s protocol either accepts the re-
ceived message or outputs an error, yi ∈ {x
′
i,⊥}.
Authentic channel A+n
key
{xi}
n
i=1 {yi}
n
i=1
kk
{xi}
n
i=1 {bi}
n
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n
Figure 10 – Amultiple authentic channel with key
recycling A+n . Alice has access to the left interface,
Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower
interface. Alice can send n messages {xi}
n
i=1. Eve
obtains these messages, and can choose for each
one whether Bob receives it or an error ⊥. After
having provided Bob with either yi ∈ {xi,⊥} for
every message, the resource generates a new key k,
which is given to both players.
messages. This is depicted in Figure 9.
The resource constructed by this protocol is il-
lustrated in Figure 10. It corresponds to a sim-
ple modification of the resource for one message
(Figure 6), in which multiple messages can now be
input. For each message, the adversary can pro-
vide one bit bi ∈ {0, 1} that either lets the original
message through or produces an error at Bob’s in-
terface. Once all bits {bi}
n
i=1 have been input, the
resource A+n outputs a new key k at Bob’s interface,
and waits for the timeout to occur to output k at
Alice’s interface as well.
Note that neither of the resources from Figures 9
and 10 expect all messages {xi}
n
i=1 to be input si-
multaneously, they can be transmitted one at a
time. These messages are processed in the order
in which they are received, i.e., the first message
input at the A-interface is labeled x1, the second
is labeled x2, etc. Likewise, the i
th message-tag
pair input at the E-interface is labeled x′i‖t
′
i and
its authenticity is verified with the keys k1 and k
i
2.
5.2 Security
To prove that πauth
+
n constructs the ideal resource
A+n we use as simulator n independent copies of
the simulator σauth+E from Figure 8. We show that
with this simulator, the ideal and real systems are
nε-close, namely
πauth
+
n (Kn‖Cn) ≈nε A
+
nσ
auth+
n
E .
To do this, we rewrite the real and ideal systems
as sequences of boxes which we denote R and I,
behaving similarly to one round of the real and ideal
systems, respectively. We then show by induction
that n copies of R and one key generation system
K are nε-close to n copies of I and one K.
Theorem 6. The protocol for authenticating n
messages with the same hash function, πauth
+
n , is
nε-secure, i.e.,
Kn‖Cn
piauth
+
n ,nε
−−−−−−→ A+n .
Proof. As in the case of one round of authentication
from Section 4, if Eve is inactive—which we model
as a converters ♯E , ♭E plugged into the E-interface
and allowing Alice’s messages through— the real
and ideal systems are both equivalent to a channel
that perfectly transmits n messages. They are thus
indistinguishable.
In the case of an active adversary, let σ
auth+
n
E
denote the n copies of the simulator for the one
message case, which we use as simulator in this
proof. Consider the real and ideal systems, namely
πauth
+
n (Kn‖Cn) and A
+
nσ
auth+
n
E . Both of them out-
put at Alice’s interface a key k1 which is a copy
of the key output at Bob’s interface; both of them
output the key at the same time, when the timeout
occurs. Receiving this key therefore cannot help
the distinguisher, so we can ignore it.
Now consider two boxes. The first, K, simply
produces a uniformly distributed key k1. The sec-
ond, R, behaves similarly to the composed systems
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of Alice, Bob and the channels for one round of au-
thentication. It takes a key k1 and message x as
input. If it receives k1 before x, it stores the key,
generates a random k2 and waits for x. Upon re-
ceiving x, it outputs x‖t with t = hk1(x) ⊕ k2. If
it first receives the message x before k1, it outputs
x‖t where t is a uniformly random tag of the cor-
rect length. Upon receiving k1 later, it retroactively
computes what key k2 would have resulted in the
tag t, namely k2 = t⊕hk1(x). Upon receiving x
′‖t′
it checks if t′ = hk1(x
′) ⊕ k2 and outputs either x
′
or ⊥ as well as k1. If no message x
′‖t′ is input by
the timeout, it outputs ⊥ and k1.
A sequence of n such boxes— depicted on the
left in Figure 11— is identical to the real system
without Alice’s recycled key. Both systems output
exactly the same messages with the same probabil-
ities. What is more, every system R receives k1 be-
fore x′‖t′, because the messages are authenticated
in order, i.e., the ith pair is sent to the ith box at
which point k1 is transmitted to the box i + 1. It
can thus always check whether t′ = hk1(x
′)⊕ k2.
The ideal system can similarly be rewritten as
a sequence of boxes I, with one final box K that
generates a new key. After receiving some message
x, each box I outputs a uniform tag t appended to
the message. Upon receiving some x′‖t′, each box
outputs ⊥ if no x had been received or if (x′‖t′) 6=
(x‖t), and x otherwise. It then notifies the next box
that it is finished. The final box notifies the key
generating box K, which outputs a new key. If the
timeout occurs, all boxes that have not produced
an output y ∈ {x,⊥} yet, output an error ⊥ and
the key generation box outputs a new key.
A sequence of n such boxes— depicted on the
right in Figure 11— is identical to the ideal system
without Alice’s recycled key. Both systems output
exactly the same messages with the same probabili-
ties. So the distance between the real and ideal sys-
tems of multiple message authentication with key
recycling is equal to the distance between these re-
cursive systems depicted in Figure 11,
d
(
πauth
+
n (Kn‖Cn),A
+
nσ
auth+
n
E
)
= d(KR1 · · ·Rn, I1 · · · InK),
where we have numbered the boxes with subscripts.
We prove by induction that these systems can be
distinguished with advantage at most nε. The case
K
R
R
...
R
I
I
...
I
K
k1
k1
k1
k1
k1
ok
ok
ok
ok
k
x x‖t
x′‖t′x′,⊥ x x‖t
x′‖t′x,⊥
x x‖t
x′‖t′x′,⊥
x x‖t
x′‖t′x,⊥
x x‖t
x′‖t′x′,⊥
x x‖t
x′‖t′x,⊥
Figure 11 – The real and ideal authentication sys-
tems rearranged as a sequence of boxes R and I.
I simply generates a uniform tag t independently
from the message x, and outputs an error ⊥ if
(x‖t) 6= (x′‖t′) or if no message x has been pro-
vided. The box R transmits k1 to the next box
only after having output y ∈ {x,⊥}. If it receives
x before having gotten k1 from the previous box,
it outputs a uniformly random t and retroactively
computes k2 = hk1(x)⊕ t when provided with k1.
of n = 1 is proven by Theorem 5. If this holds for
n− 1, we have
d(KR1 · · ·Rn−1, I1 · · · In−1K) ≤ (n− 1)ε.
Because the distinguishing advantage respects the
triangle inequality (Eq. (7)) and is non-increasing
under composition with other systems (Eq. (8)), we
have
d(KR1 · · ·Rn, I1 · · · InK)
≤ d(KR1 · · ·Rn, I1KR2 · · ·Rn)
+ d(I1KR2 · · ·Rn, I1 · · · InK)
≤ d(KR1, I1K) + d(KR2 · · ·Rn, I2 · · · InK)
≤ ε+ (n− 1)ε.
The protocol πauth
+
n still uses synchronization for
Alice to know that it is safe to recycle the key k1
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for arbitrary use after the nth message has been
sent. Wegman and Carter’s original authentication
scheme does not do this, it only recycles the key
for further rounds of authentication. This can be
seen as destroying the key when there are no more
messages to be authenticated. It can thus be mod-
eled with the real and ideal systems of πauth
+
n , but
with the final recycled key removed, which simulta-
neously removes all need for synchronization. This
can only decrease the distance between the real and
ideal systems. Note that if we remove all form of
synchronization, Bob cannot know that messages
have been sent, he will therefore not output some
error ⊥ if he receives nothing, but simple wait and
do nothing.
Corollary 7. Wegman and Carter’s scheme for
authenticating n messages is nε-secure in a com-
pletely asynchronous network.
6 Secret key leakage
In this section we look at attacks on Wegman and
Carter’s authentication scheme. We show that in
the special case where a ε-AXU2 hash function with
ε = 1|T | is recycled for n rounds, there exists an
attack which meets the upper bound on the failure
probability of Corollary 7. This means that the
attack successfully corrupts at least one of the n
messages with probability nε.
For the adversary to obtain this total success
probability, the success probability in each round
must increase, as the following calculation shows.
Let us define {Fi}i to be a sequence of random vari-
ables taking the value 1 if the adversary successfully
corrupts a message in any of the first i rounds, and
0 otherwise. We then have for any 0 ≤ i ≤ 1/ε− 1,
PFi+1|Fi(1|0) =
PFi+1(1)− PFi+1Fi(1, 1)
PFi(0)
=
(i+ 1)ε− iε
1− iε
=
ε
1− iε
.
PFi+1|Fi(1|0) is strictly increasing in i, i.e., the suc-
cess probability for the adversary increases in every
round. This is because—as we show in Theorem 8
here below—some information about the hash func-
tion is leaked in every round, even if the key used for
the OTP is perfectly uniform. The entropy of the
hash function gradually decreases, until the adver-
sary has enough information to successfully corrupt
a new message with probability 1.
This result contrasts strongly with the non-com-
posable analysis found in [1]. There, the adver-
sary simply collects the pairs of messages and tags
(x1, t1), (x2, t2), . . . , and attempts to corrupt a mes-
sage in each round, independently from the at-
tempts in previous rounds. In this case, due to
the hiding property of the OTP, the distribution of
the hash function always remains perfectly uniform
given these message-tag pairs.
Theorem 8. If the same hash function from a
family of 1|T | -almost XOR universal2 functions is
recycled in n rounds of authentication, for any
1 ≤ n ≤ |T |, there exists an attack that allows the
adversary to successfully corrupt one of the first n
messages with probability at least n/|T |. Further-
more, after n rounds, the entropy of the recycled
key K is bounded by
H(K|Zn) ≤ log
|K|
|T |
+
(
1−
n
|T |
)
log(|T | − n),
where Zn consists of all the inputs and outputs of
the protocol— the messages, tags, and accept or re-
ject results— from these n rounds.
Proof. This attack assumes that the adversary, Eve,
gets to choose which messages are sent, and learns
whether a corrupted message was accepted or not.
Eve chooses to always send the same message x
during these n rounds, and always substitutes the
same message x′ 6= x for x in each round as well.
To be successful, she needs to guess correctly the
value c = hk1(x) ⊕ hk1(x
′), since t′ = t ⊕ c, where
t is the tag that comes with x and t′ is the correct
tag for x′. Since the family of hash functions is
1
|T | -AXU2, the distribution of c is uniform.
23 Eve
therefore makes a list of the |T | possible values for
c, and in each round eliminates one from her list.
In the first round she receives (x, t1) from the in-
secure channel, picks a c1 from her list and sends
(x′, t1 ⊕ c1) back on the channel. The legitimate
player accepts the message received from the adver-
sary only if c1 = hk1(x) ⊕ hk1(x
′), which happens
with probability p1 = |T |
−1.
23For any family of functions,∑
c
Prk[hk(x1)⊕ hk(x2) = c] = 1 for all x1 6= x2. So being
1
|T |
-AXU2 means that Prk[hk(x1)⊕ hk(x2) = c] =
1
|T |
.
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If she is unsuccessful at corrupting the message,
she can cross c1 off her list. In the second round she
then receives (x, t2), picks a new c2 6= c1, and sends
(x′, t2 ⊕ c2). This time her success probability is
p2 = (|T |−1)
−1, since she only has |T |−1 elements
c left on the list which are all equally probable.
If we repeat this for each round, the success prob-
ability in the ith round given that the previous i−1
were unsuccessful is pi = (|T | − i + 1)
−1. We now
prove by induction that the probability of success-
fully corrupting at least one message with this strat-
egy is exactly i/|T |. Let Fi be a random variable
taking the value 1 if the adversary successfully cor-
rupts a message in any of the first i rounds, and 0
otherwise. We have PF1(1) = p1 = 1/|T |. And if
PFi−1(1) = (i− 1)/|T |, then
PFi(1) = PFi−1(1) + PFi−1(0)pi
=
i− 1
|T |
+
(
1−
i− 1
|T |
)
1
|T | − i+ 1
=
i
|T |
.
Let z0 represent any value of Zn in which Eve
fails to corrupt any message, and z1 be the case
where she does trick the legitimate players. If she is
successful, she immediately learns the correct value
c, and thus
H(K|Zn = z1) = log
|K|
|T |
.
If Eve is not successful, she has still managed to
cross n values for c off her list, so
H(K|Zn = z0) = log
|K|
|T |
(|T | − n).
Combining the two equations above with the cor-
responding probabilities, we get
H(K|Zn) =
(
1−
n
|T |
)
log
|K|
|T |
(|T | − n)
+
n
|T |
log
|K|
|T |
.
Appendices
A Security proof for standard
authentication
We showed in Section 3 that the security of
standard authentication reduces to proving that
Eqs. (9) and (10) are bounded by ε for all choices
of input distributions for x, x′, t′, which we rewrite
here:
1
2
∑
x,t,x′,t′,y
∣∣PXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x′, t′, y)
−QXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x
′, t′, y)
∣∣ ≤ ε, (13)
1
2
∑
x′,t′,y
∣∣PX′T ′Y (x′, t′, y)
−QX′T ′Y (x
′, t′, y)
∣∣ ≤ ε. (14)
In fact, these two equations are strictly weaker
than the security conditions derived by Wegman
and Carter [1] and Stinson [2], who maximize over
all x, t, x′, t′ instead of over x, x′, t′. It is therefore
immediate that previous work on information-theo-
retic authentication (without key recycling) is com-
posable. We have however given a simplification
of the more common ε-ASU2 hashing definition,
which does not include the extra requirement that
Pr[hk(x) = t] =
1
|T | (see Footnote 13 on page 4),
without which Stinson’s proof [2] does not apply.
We therefore provide a new proof of security here.
Lemma 9. The standard authentication protocol,
πauth, is ε-secure.
This lemma uses the same proof technique as
Theorem 5: we reduce the statistical distance to
the sum over all events which are more probable
in the real case, namely accepting a corrupted mes-
sage.
Proof. We start with impersonation attacks,
namely Eq. (14). From the definition of ASU2 hash-
ing, we have for any x′, t′ and x 6= x′,
Pr
k
[hk(x
′) = t′] =
∑
t
[hk(x) = t and hk(x
′) = t′]
≤ ε.
And since for all x′, t′ the ideal system always re-
jects the corrupted message, QY |X′T ′(⊥|x
′, t′) = 1,
and the maximization of Eq. (14) over PX′T ′ re-
duces to
max
x′,t′
PY |X′T ′(x
′|x′, t′) = max
x′,t′
Pr
k
[hk(x
′) = t′] ≤ ε.
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For the substitution attack we need to show
that Eq. (13) is satisfied for all PX = QX and
PX′T ′|XT = QX′T ′|XT . If the distinguisher chooses
x′ = x, both the real and ideal systems behave iden-
tically— they both accept x if t′ = t and produce
an error otherwise. We can therefore only consider
the distributions with PXX′(x, x) = 0. In this case,
the simulator in the ideal setting always outputs
an error ⊥, i.e., QY (⊥) = 1. Then from Eq. (1),
Eq. (13) reduces to
∑
x,t,x′,t′
PXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x
′, t′, x′) ≤ ε.
Combining,
PXTX′T ′(x, t, x
′, t′)
= PX(x)PT |X (t|x)PX′T ′|XT (x
′, t′|x, t),
PT |X(t|x) = Pr
k
[hk(x) = t],
PY |XTX′T ′(x
′|x, t, x′, t′)
= Pr
k
[hk(x
′) = t′|hk(x) = t],
we get
∑
x,t,x′,t′
PXTX′T ′Y (x, t, x
′, t′, x′)
=
∑
x,t,x′,t′
PX(x)PX′T ′|XT (x
′, t′|x, t)
Pr
k
[hk(x) = t and hk(x
′) = t′]
≤
∑
x,t,x′,t′
PX(x)PX′T ′|XT (x
′, t′|x, t)
ε
|T |
=
∑
t
ε
|T |
= ε.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Renato Renner,
Christoph Pacher and Ueli Maurer for valuable dis-
cussions and helpful comments.
This work has been funded by the Swiss National
Science Foundation (via grant No. 200020-135048
and the National Centre of Competence in Re-
search ‘Quantum Science and Technology’), the Eu-
ropean Research Council – ERC (grant no. 258932)
– and by the Vienna Science and Technology Fund
(WWTF) through project ICT10-067 (HiPANQ).
References
[1] Mark N. Wegman and Larry Carter. New hash
functions and their use in authentication and
set equality. Journal of Computer and System
Sciences, 22(3):265–279, 1981.
[2] Douglas R. Stinson. Universal hashing and
authentication codes. Designs, Codes and
Cryptography, 4(3):369–380, 1994. A pre-
liminary version appeared at CRYPTO ’91.
[doi:10.1007/BF01388651].
[3] Ran Canetti. Universally composable secu-
rity: A new paradigm for cryptographic pro-
tocols. In Proceedings of the 42nd Sym-
posium on Foundations of Computer Sci-
ence, FOCS ’01, pages 136–145. IEEE, 2001.
[doi:0.1109/SFCS.2001.959888].
[4] Ran Canetti. Universally composable se-
curity: A new paradigm for cryptographic
protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Re-
port 2000/067, 2013. Updated version of [3].
[IACR e-print: 2000/067].
[5] Ran Canetti, Yevgeniy Dodis, Rafael Pass,
and Shabsi Walfish. Universally com-
posable security with global setup. In
Theory of Cryptography, Proceedings of
TCC 2007, volume 4392 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 61–85. Springer,
2007. [doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7 4,
IACR e-print: 2006/432].
[6] Birgit Pfitzmann and Michael Waidner. Com-
position and integrity preservation of secure re-
active systems. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CSS ’00, pages 245–254. ACM, 2000.
[doi:10.1145/352600.352639].
[7] Birgit Pfitzmann and Michael Waidner. A
model for asynchronous reactive systems and
its application to secure message transmis-
sion. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 184–200. IEEE, 2001.
[doi:10.1109/SECPRI.2001.924298].
[8] Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and
Michael Waidner. A general composition the-
orem for secure reactive systems. In The-
ory of Cryptography, Proceedings of TCC
18
2004, volume 2951 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 336–354. Springer, 2004.
[doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24638-1 19].
[9] Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and
Michael Waidner. The reactive simulata-
bility (RSIM) framework for asynchronous
systems. Information and Computation,
205(12):1685–1720, 2007. Extended ver-
sion of [7]. [doi:10.1016/j.ic.2007.05.002,
IACR e-print: 2004/082].
[10] Michael Ben-Or and Dominic Mayers. Gen-
eral security definition and composability for
quantum & classical protocols. eprint, 2004.
[arXiv:quant-ph/0409062].
[11] Dominique Unruh. Simulatable security
for quantum protocols. eprint, 2004.
[arXiv:quant-ph/0409125].
[12] Dominique Unruh. Universally compos-
able quantum multi-party computation. In
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT
2010, volume 6110 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 486–505. Springer,
2010. [doi:10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5 25,
arXiv:0910.2912].
[13] Ueli Maurer and Renato Renner. Abstract
cryptography. In Proceedings of Innovations
in Computer Science, ICS 2010, pages 1–21.
Tsinghua University Press, 2011.
[14] Valerio Scarani, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci,
Nicolas J. Cerf, Miloslav Dusˇek, Norbert
Lu¨tkenhaus, and Momtchil Peev. The security
of practical quantum key distribution. Reviews
of Modern Physics, 81:1301–1350, Septem-
ber 2009. [doi:10.1103/RevModPhys.81.1301,
arXiv:0802.4155].
[15] Michael Ben-Or, Michael Horodecki, Deb-
bie Leung, Dominic Mayers, and Jonathan
Oppenheim. The universal composable
security of quantum key distribution. In
Theory of Cryptography, Proceedings of
TCC 2005, volume 3378 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 386–406. Springer,
2005. [doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7 21,
arXiv:quant-ph/0409078].
[16] Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade and Renato Renner.
Composability in quantum cryptography.
New Journal of Physics, 11(8):085006,
2009. [doi:10.1088/1367-2630/11/8/085006,
arXiv:1006.2215].
[17] Christopher Portmann and Renato Renner.
Cryptographic security of quantum key distri-
bution. eprint, 2014. [arXiv:1409.3525].
[18] Hugo Krawczyk. LFSR-based hashing and
authentication. In Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO ’94, volume 839 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 129–139. Springer,
1994. [doi:10.1007/3-540-48658-5 15].
[19] Hugo Krawczyk. New hash functions
for message authentication. In Advances
in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’95, vol-
ume 921 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 301–310. Springer, 1995.
[doi:10.1007/3-540-49264-X 24].
[20] Phillip Rogaway. Bucket hashing and its ap-
plication to fast message authentication. Jour-
nal of Cryptology, 12(2):91–115, 1999. A pre-
liminary version appeared at CRYPTO ’95.
[doi:10.1007/PL00003822].
[21] Mustafa Atici and Douglas R. Stinson. Uni-
versal hashing and multiple authentication.
In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO ’96,
volume 1109 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 16–30. Springer, 1996.
[doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5 2].
[22] Patrick Hayden, Debbie Leung, and Dominic
Mayers. The universal composable security of
quantum message authentication with key re-
cycling. Presented at QCrypt 2011, 2011.
[23] Victor Shoup. On fast and provably se-
cure message authentication based on univer-
sal hashing. In Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO ’96, volume 1109 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 313–328. Springer,
1996. [doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5 24].
[24] Daniel J. Bernstein. Stronger security bounds
for wegman-carter-shoup authenticators. In
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2005,
19
volume 3494 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 164–180. Springer, 2005.
[doi:10.1007/11426639 10].
[25] Ran Canetti. Universally composable signa-
ture, certification, and authentication. In
Proceedings of the 17th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Workshop, page 219.
IEEE, 2004. [doi:10.1109/CSFW.2004.24,
IACR e-print: 2003/239].
[26] Jo¨rgen Cederlo¨f and Jan-A˚ke Larsson. Se-
curity aspects of the authentication used
in quantum cryptography. IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, 54(4):1735–
1741, 2008. [doi:10.1109/TIT.2008.917697,
arXiv:quant-ph/0611009].
[27] Aysajan Abidin and Jan-A˚ke Larsson. Se-
curity of authentication with a fixed key
in quantum key distribution. eprint, 2011.
[arXiv:1109.5168].
[28] Ueli Maurer. Authentication amplification
by synchronization. In Proceedings of the
2013 IEEE International Symposium on Infor-
mation Theory, ISIT 2013, pages 2711–2714.
IEEE, 2013. [doi:10.1109/ISIT.2013.6620719].
[29] Nino Walenta, Andreas Burg, Dario
Caselunghe, Jeremy Constantin, Nicolas
Gisin, Olivier Guinnard, Raphael Houlmann,
Pascal Junod, Boris Korzh, Natalia Kulesza,
Matthieu Legre´, Charles Ci Wen Lim, Tom-
maso Lunghi, Laurent Monat, Christopher
Portmann, Mathilde Soucarros, Patrick Trin-
kler, Gregory Trolliet, Fabien Vannel, and
Hugo Zbinden. A fast and versatile quan-
tum key distribution system with hardware
key distillation and wavelength multiplex-
ing. New Journal of Physics, 16(1):013047,
2014. [doi:10.1088/1367-2630/16/1/013047,
arXiv:1309.2583].
[30] Ju¨rgen Bierbrauer, Thomas Johansson, Gre-
gory Kabatianskii, and Ben Smeets. On fami-
lies of hash functions via geometric codes and
concatenation. In Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO ’93, volume 773 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 331–342. Springer,
1994. [doi:10.1007/3-540-48329-2 28].
[31] Douglas R. Stinson. On the connections be-
tween universal hashing, combinatorial designs
and error-correcting codes. Electronic Collo-
quium on Computational Complexity (ECCC),
2(52), 1995.
[32] Ueli Maurer. Constructive cryptography—
a new paradigm for security definitions
and proofs. In Proceedings of Theory of
Security and Applications, TOSCA 2011,
volume 6993 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 33–56. Springer, 2012.
[doi:10.1007/978-3-642-27375-9 3].
[33] Vedran Dunjko, Joseph Fitzsimons, Christo-
pher Portmann, and Renato Renner. Compos-
able security of delegated quantum computa-
tion. To appear at ASIACRYPT 2014, 2014.
[arXiv:1301.3662].
[34] Ueli Maurer. Indistinguishability of ran-
dom systems. In Lars Knudsen, editor, Ad-
vances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2002,
volume 2332 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 110–132. Springer, 2002.
[doi:10.1007/3-540-46035-7 8].
[35] Ueli Maurer, Krzysztof Pietrzak, and Re-
nato Renner. Indistinguishability amplifica-
tion. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO
2007, volume 4622 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 130–149. Springer, 2007.
[doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74143-5 8].
[36] Gus Gutoski and John Watrous. Toward a
general theory of quantum games. In Proceed-
ings of the 39th Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting, STOC ’07, pages 565–574. ACM, 2007.
[doi:10.1145/1250790.1250873].
[37] Giulio Chiribella, Giacomo Mauro
D’Ariano, and Paolo Perinotti. Theo-
retical framework for quantum networks.
Physical Review A, 80:022339, August
2009. [doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.80.022339,
arXiv:0904.4483].
20
